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1. Introduction
1 
There are remarkably parallel developments in many of the banking sectors of early-
stage transitional economies which carry so much similar baggage from Communist central-
planing. More often than not, what is spawned, are fragmented, poorly capitalized banks with 
highly concentrated lending portfolios (often to insiders) and lax provisioning for 
emergencies. Government bank supervision, having no history, is embryonic and has limited 
effectiveness. Banks, in this environment, have little incentive for upgrading.  
Unfortunately, but somewhat predictably, major and minor financial sector crises have 
occurred in several of the transitional economies. Bulgaria is still trying to repair the large 
extent of damage to the real economy (estimated at 14 per cent of GDP), triggered by the 
banking sector breakdown last year. And even the Czech Republic, in certain ways a leader in 
the transition, has experienced dislocation to the real economy as a result of banking failures.
2  
This paper explores the methods that the Ukrainian government (supported by 
international technical assistance providers) is developing to minimize the probability of a 
damaging, systemic banking crisis. The contention is that with highly lucrative existing 
sources of income for banks receding (and profits under increasing pressure), banks will more 
aggressively expand their balance sheets — but not necessarily in a healthy manner — as well 
as engage more in riskier off-balance sheet activities, such as foreign exchange trading. Thus, 
in the coming period, the fragility of the Ukrainian banking system could increase, leaving the 
system at greater risk.  
The first two sections briefly review banking under the Communist system, and in the 
first period of the transitional governments. Then follows an in-depth discussion of Ukraine 
which explores at some length some of the elements needed for a more comprehensive 
strategy. An appendix deals with the question of banking sector strategy in more general 
terms.  
1.1. Banking in the Communist System 
The story of banking in the closing years of the Communist economies is well known. 
The so-called “banking system” passively accommodated the central production plan. Banks 
had no independent role in credit allocation. Enterprise deposits were blocked accounts which 
the government could and did confiscate. But since spending allocation was determined by 
the central plan, “cash in the bank” did not influence production. As part of the whole system 
of “soft budget constraints” banks in Communist economies could be more properly 
characterized as an arm of the finance ministry.  
                                              
1 The author is Senior Banking Advisor, US AID Kiev. The views expressed are not attributable 
to US AID. The author would like to thank Alan Roe The World Bank, James Horner Barents-KPMG 
and Peter Sochan Citizens Network for their valuable comments, but remains responsible for the 
content. 
2 Caprio, Gerald, and Daniela Kingebiel, Bank Insolvencies: Cross Country Experience, “Policy 
Research Working Paper”, No. 1620, The World Bank, July 1996. According to the authors, in the 
early 1980s, the direct effects of the Argentine crisis amounted to over 50 per cent of real GDP and for 
Chile 40 per cent. The largest loss was the 1980s US savings and loan crisis which was estimated at 
$150 billion. This, however, amounted to only 3 per cent of US GNP. Developing Sound Banks in Transitional Ecoomies... 
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Neither risk management nor prudential concerns were at issue in this environment. Nor 
did the Communist bankers need to hone their credit evaluation skills because they had no 
role in selecting projects. There was no need for a risk-oriented bank supervision function (as 
opposed to one which is a watchdog over centrally allocated funds flow), nor for effective 
legislation delineating property rules, collateral standards and bankruptcy procedures. 
Even after commercial banks were hived off following banking reforms during the mid- 
and late-1980s, there was still very little competition in the financial system. Newly formed 
state banks had portfolios highly segregated by both region and industry. Enterprises were not 
allowed to do business with more than one bank (a control mechanism which carried over 
until recently in Ukraine). Interest rate and credit allocation were still largely determined 
centrally. Moreover, only the national savings bank was empowered to take deposits and lend 
to households, maintaining separate monetary circuits between households and enterprises. In 
this environment enterprises had a bias for holding real assets — often in the form of large 
inventories — in order to hedge against, and have resources to deal with chronic shortages of 
the centrally-planned system.
3 
As the Communist economic system became increasingly dysfunctional during the 
1980s, there was dynamic development of an informal sector in the real economy, both 
outside and inside the confines of the planned economy. The former was characterized by 
small scale traders and household construction services; the latter by what could be 
characterized as institutionalized moonlighting. Thus, at the time of the centrally-planned 
communist system's disintegration, the real sector was at the edges developing genuine 
market relationships, while the financial sector remained largely repressed in most countries. 
Banking, as we understand it, simply did not exist. 
1.2. Banking in the Early-Stage Transitional Economies 
As might be expected, while the contours of the banking system may have changed, 
fundamentals from the Communist system do not die so easily. In many transitional countries 
it is taking some years for the government to stop using banks as ministry of finance funding 
funnels to politically favored industries (agriculture, energy), although in general this 
mechanism of the “soft budget constraint” is slowly disappearing. (And in many of the more 
advanced Central and Eastern European countries has all but stopped.)  
There is another variant on this theme of directed lending, however, which is still an 
important problem for many countries of the former Soviet Union. This is the problem of 
“pocket banks.” In the early stage of the transition, the chaos and uncertainty of the 
government's continuation of automatic funding encouraged state enterprises to take matters 
in their own hands — they simply started their own banks. Thus, instead of being a ministry 
of finance extension, “pocket banks” became extensions of their founding enterprise's 
treasury. In neither case, however, did these so-called banks play a market intermediation 
function, allocating funds to the most efficient businesses according to price (interest rate).  
A second characteristic of many of the early-stage transition banking systems is ease of 
entry and very low capitalization requirements. Unlike some industries, in banking small is 
not necessarily beautiful. For example, effective hedging of portfolio risk requires a critical 
                                              
3 With central economic control loosening, there was a buildup of inter-enterprise credits. In a 
situation, where financing is restricted and there are severe distribution bottlenecks, firms protected 
their suppliers and customers either by overt funding, or generous collection terms, or a lenient 
attitude towards arrears. The vertical integration of the centrally-planned economies made this 
problem particularly intractable. L. Landy 
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mass of loans. Banking is an inherently unstable industry because of the kind of business 
banks conduct — a business in which information is both hard to come by and to assess, and 
the “good” which one “buys” from a bank, a money loan, is not paid for until sometime in the 
future.  
This information problem makes banking a volatile industry and one almost uniquely 
susceptible to contagion. A run on one bank can spread quickly and jeopardize sound banking 
institutions. Mature banks have a whole science of asset/liability management to guard 
against this inherent problem of the banking industry, including diversification of the asset 
portfolio, diversification of sources of funding and matching time distribution on the two 
sides of the balance sheet. While a critical scale is not the sufficient condition, it is certainly a 
necessary condition to be able to diversify portfolio and hedge against systemic volatility. 
Sufficient size is also necessary to make financially viable investment in computer equipment 
which utilizes sophisticated tools. 
A further profound problem for banking development in the early-stage transitional 
economies is that the “rules of the game” are not known or keep changing — more baggage 
from the Communist system. The centrally planned economies were overlain by an 
authoritarian, paternalistic political superstructure. The Communist governments could act 
with impunity in every sphere. In the financial sphere, enterprise and household deposits at 
banks could be confiscated. In the early days of the transition, before formal breakup of the 
USSR, in a confiscatory currency redenomination, limits were put on amount and timing of 
the money exchange. More subtly, but equally powerful, inflation too is a form of 
confiscation of financial savings.  
Legislation which lays down the “rules of the game” in the financial sphere is 
understandably inadequate in many transitional economies, given the limited time which has 
elapsed. It is not difficult to understand why this level of uncertainty and lack of strong 
prudential oversight by the government, in the inherently unstable banking industry, would 
give rise to a plethora of banking practices, some of which are well outside the accepted 
norms of banking practice in developed market economies. 
In addition to all of these industry specific structural problems was the overlay of an 
unstable macro environment, particularly in the early days. (Even now, Ukraine is still 
registering declining real economic growth, according to official statistics.) The situation is 
thus an inherently volatile industry, banking, is placed against a landscape of a new economic 
system going through enormous gyrations. The result is an enormous decline in financial 
intermediation. Some part of this disintermediation has manifest as inter-enterprise credits 
and arrears. Ironically, what probably kept systemic risk within bounds in some countries was 
that hyperinflation eroded the value of the banking system's impaired loans portfolio. 
1.3. Separating the Wheat from the Chaff 
What is currently needed in many countries of the region is market tiering, which 
rationalizes the banking system — separates the wheat from the chaff. There are several ways 
evolution to a more efficient, sounder system can be accomplished. The most desirable is for 
strong banks (including foreign banks and other strategic investors) to take over weaker banks 
through mergers. For strong banks to have such an incentive there must be franchise value in 
the failed bank, for example, a branch network, property. ( For Ukrainian banks, however, it 
is difficult to see in most cases this would be strong enough to impel a strong bank to take 
over the problems as well.)  
Another form of market solution is that the system is rationalized through a systemic 
banking crisis as we saw dramatically last year in Bulgaria. As noted earlier, banking is an Developing Sound Banks in Transitional Ecoomies... 
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industry uniquely susceptible to contagion. When a shoe store fails, this does not jeopardize 
the future of other shoe stores in the neighborhood. When a bank fails, however, the situation 
can be different. The initial failure can spread to credible banks and sweep them away in its 
wake. There is reason to think that this form of market solution would not give an optimal 
solution. More probable, a systemic banking crisis could cause considerable damage to the 
economy; be very costly to the government; and not always lead to a stronger, more efficient 
banking system. 
An alternative approach is to orchestrate the rationalization of the system through a 
government program which addresses, among other things: a) fragmentation of the banking 
system; b) the fragile condition of many banks; and c) the lack of incentives for banks, 
themselves, to upgrade their practice. Supporting all of the above, is the need for further 
advances in the development of the legal infrastructure. 
Rectification of these weaknesses, however, is a gradual process. In fact, the current 
consensus, among specialists, who have worked on developing banking sectors in transitional 
economies is that structural reform and developing the fundamentals for the countries of the 
former Soviet Union will take much longer than originally expected. For policy makers the 
development of optimal bank regulation and supervision is not an easy matter. To say it is 
desirable to “orchestrate” banking sector rationalization begs the question of how significant a 
role government should play. Since it is virtually impossible to “get it right” until an 
extensive body of experience develops, should the inclination be to err on the side of too 
much or too little government intervention?  
In a compelling paper, Honohan and Vittas, World Bank economists, look at this 
question through the lens of the recent theoretical work which stresses the network 
characteristics of banking and finance
4. Their conclusion, based on the network framework is 
that it is desirable to use a “light hand” in adding to what might be termed the basic 
institutional infrastructure.  
In Ukraine, emerging all too recently from a central planning environment, in which the 
state not only interfered but controlled, an inclination to the light touch seems a sensible way 
to proceed although this should be caveated. For, according to statistics, real growth of the 
official economy in Ukraine has been falling for five years. By some measures, the 
cumulative decline of the official economy is a startling almost 70 per cent.
5 While the 
savings and loan crisis in the United States only cost 3 per cent of GDP and thus, was 
“contained” (it did not have a significant deflationary impact on the real economy), in the 
context of Ukraine, even a much smaller output cost could derail the fragile economic 
recovery.  
Moreover, the banking sector is very small, for reasons described below. There is a 
great deal of public mistrust and cynicism about banks' ability to act as a safe recipient for 
savings, despite the fact that the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) has successfully brought 
inflation down to respectable levels now for some period. A systemic wide crisis would 
                                              
4 Honohan, Patrick and Dimitri Vittas, Bank Regulation and the Network Paradigm, “Policy 
Research Working Paper”, No. 1631, The World Bank, August 1996. The network characteristics of 
banking discussed are 1.) the externalities which inhibit Pareto optimal solutions (and justify the 
government's role); 2.) the observation that the system is robust to partial failure, offering multiple 
paths if one is blocked; 3.) its complexity, so that intervention in one area will typically produce both 
far-reaching and hard to predict effects. They conclude, “The three considerations pull policy design 
in opposite directions; although networks are not fragile, the pervasive externalities do call for 
intervention, but the complexity makes successful intervention hard to design”. 
5 This is partially offset by the upsurge of growth in the shadow, unofficial economy which is 
estimated at about 50 per cent of GDP. L. Landy 
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undermine still further public perception of banks and could forestall financial 
reintermediation for years to come, further complicating economic growth. Given this current 
environment in Ukraine, while a fist, or even a heavy hand, is to be avoided, at the same time, 
the government should be encouraged to take a proactive role in developing the prudential 
regulatory structure, as well as a more long-term strategy for the banking sector. 
2. Ukraine 
2.1. A Snapshot of the Banking Sector 
There are currently about 188 banks with NBU approved licenses (and another 51 banks 
in some stage of reorganization or liquidation). The banking system can be divided into 
several categories
6. The largest banks evolved from the original Soviet monobank system 
described earlier. Two banks are still owned by the state, the Oschadny Bank (savings banks) 
and the State Export Import Bank.
7 There are three former state-owned banks; Bank Ukraina 
(the agriculture sector bank), Prominvest (the heavy industry bank) and Ukrsotsbank (social 
and municipal services).
8 These three banks are still used by the government for directed 
lending, although with decreasing frequency.  
The remainder are private banks which did not develop from the old structures. As 
noted earlier, with the breakdown of the centrally planned economy, many of these banks 
were initiated by enterprises to secure funding. At the end of 1994, only twenty-seven banks 
out of a total of 220 had more than $500,000 in statutory (equity) capital. Almost 100 banks 
had less than $100,000.
9  
As recently as April of this year there were still more than 50 banks with less than $1 
million in statutory capital. It is possible that many of these entities may not survive in their 
current form, if the National Bank's statutory capital requirement of one million ECU, which 
comes into force in January 1998, is rigorously enforced. At the other end of the scale, 
however, are roughly 50 banks which are reasonably well capitalized and offer true banking 
services. Many of these will form the nucleus of a market-based system.  
Foreign financial institutions still play a small role. A National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) 
regulation restricts ownership to 15 per cent of the statutory capital of the banking system. At 
the current time foreign banks account for about 6 per cent. Ukraine is relatively liberal, in a 
                                              
6 For a more complete discussion see Sochan, Peter, The Banking System in Ukraine, “Studies 
and Analyses”, No. 65, CASE, March 1996 and Roe, Alan et al., Ukraine — Risks and Transition: A 
Review of the Financial Sector, The World Bank, June 1995. 
7 The State Export-Import Bank dates from January 1992 when the FSU Vnesheconombank 
stopped processing Ukrainian foreign trade payments. Oschadny bank was formed in 1991 from the 
FSU Sberbank (Savings Bank) 
8 Three FSU specialized lending banks were transferred in 1990 into joint stock banks. Their 
shares at that time were owned mainly by state enterprises and government entities. In 1993 the 
government indicated that shares (and dividends) of state enterprises would be controlled by the 
Ministry of Finance. The banks responded by transferring shares from the enterprises to their own 
employees and to the employees of the state-owned enterprises. Thus an opaque and diffuse ownership 
structure has emerged. With so wide a dispersion of ownership, it is not clear how accountable 
management is to the stockholders. 
9 “Monthly Bulletin”, National Bank of Ukraine. Developing Sound Banks in Transitional Ecoomies... 
 S&A No. 115  9
formal sense, in delineating the activities foreign owned or controlled banks can engage in. In 
mid-1997 there were fourteen banks with less than 50 per cent foreign ownership. There are 
four wholly owned banks; Credit Lyonnais and Societe Generale (French), Deposit Credit 
Bank of Ukraine (Polish), and Inkombank (Russian). ING and Credit Suisse are expected to 
have licenses soon. 
2.2. Macroeconomic Backdrop 
Hyperinflation has taken its toll on the banking system. At the end of 1996 the total 
assets of the entire Ukrainian banking system were only about $7 billion. This is at best 
equivalent to a small size US bank. By contrast, Komercni Banka, the largest bank in the 
Czech Republic (which has a population only 20 per cent the size of Ukraine), has assets of 
$15 billion.
10 Hyperinflation, coupled with a dramatic decline in real, official GDP is not a 
propitious situation for a banking sector to thrive. 
The accompanying tables give a picture of the extent of financial disintermediation in 
Ukraine over the last few years in the wake of a hyper inflationary episode. By the end of 
1996, broad money (currency plus bank deposits) was equal only to 11 per cent of GDP. 
Moreover, by 1996, the currency component of the money supply was even larger than 
domestic deposits, and velocity (the turnover of money) increased substantially — all 
indications of the public's growing disenchantment with the banking system. The only 
positive note through the end of last year was that as the currency stabilized, foreign currency 
deposits have dropped as a portion of total bank deposits. During the first quarter of 1997, 
official statistics indicate some improvement in financial intermediation, but whether this 
reversal is sustained remains to be seen.  
 
Table 1 
Depth of the Ukrainian Financial System (in per cent of GDP) 
(end of period)  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997-Q1 
Currency  10 9 7 5 5 6 
Domestic Currency Deposits  36 17 12 5 4 5 
Foreign Currency (FX) Deposits  4 7 9 3 2 2 
Total Money (M2)  50 33 27 13 11 13 
FX Deposits/Total Bank Deposits  10 28 42 37 34 28 
Currency/M2(Domestic Currency)  22 34 36 50 55 54 
Sources: “Monthly Bulletin”, National Bank of Ukraine; “Ukrainian Economic Trends”, EU 
Tacis 
 
                                              
10 Business Central Europe, “Wall Street Journal”, October 1996. L. Landy 
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Table 2 
Regional Comparison: Depth of the Financial System, 1994. 
(Money (M2) as a percentage of GDP) 
  OECD  Latin America C.E.E.  NIS 
Currency  6  5 17 8
Bank Deposits  67  18 25 12
Total Money (M2)  73  23 42 20
Source: World Development Report 1996, The World Bank. 
 
Last year was a critical period and in some sense a turning point. Real growth continued 
its sharp drop (10 per cent), but inflation finally decreased from 400 per cent and 180 per cent 
in 1995 and 1996 respectively, to less than 40 per cent by year-end 1996. This year promises 
a further significant inflation decline. Monetary stability laid the basis for the introduction of 
a new, redenominated currency in September 1996 which was non-confiscatory in design and 
has kept its value to date (partly reflecting an upsurge of foreign portfolio inflows into 
Ukrainian government securities). But that also means that banks will no longer be able to 
depend upon inflation to reduce the value of impaired loans. 
Part of the success in stabilizing prices came from the development of a government 
securities market which financed about one-third of the government's budget deficit last year. 
This instrument through most of 1996 carried a substantial risk premium reflecting; the 
government's poor track record hitherto in monetary stabilization; the government's uneven 
history too in honoring obligations; the fragility of the banking system and the difficulty in 
accessing the solvency of individual banks.
11 Thus, even as inflation abetted, there was still a 
substantial lag in the deceleration of interest rates. Banks were able to enjoy a more than 
respectable return through investment in government securities. 
This year, however the situation is changing. Banks' profits are coming under increasing 
pressure because the easier ways of making handsome margins on-lending are disappearing. 
As the table illustrates, commercial bank interest rate margins have fallen precipitously. The 
return banks could enjoy on Treasury securities are also less lucrative, as is lending through 
the interbank market, where pricing follows the NBU refinancing rate (which has also 
dropped in real terms). 
 
                                              
11 Only Ukrainian banks are permitted to participate in government securities auctions and to act 
as custodians. Thus, for investors, with little information about the condition of individual banks, there 
is significant custodian risk. Developing Sound Banks in Transitional Ecoomies... 
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Table 3 
Commercial Bank Interest Rate Spread  
(Quarterly average) 
  Lending Rate  Deposit Rate Difference 
1995-Q1  195.6   135.6  60.0 
1995-Q2  113.1   69.6  43.5 
1995-Q3  77.0   32.6  44.4 
1995-Q4  105.2   35.4  69.8 
1996-Q1  108.0  48.7 59.3
1996-Q2  83.4  33.5 49.9
1996-Q3  64.3  26.4 37.9
1996-Q4  63.8  25.9 37.9
1997-Q1  59.8  22.3 37.5
1997-April  52.4  19.1 33.3
Source: “Monthly Bulletin”, National Bank of Ukraine. 
 
At the same time, because of the sorry history of hyperinflation, some recent, well-
publicized large private bank failures, and most recently the addition of a government 
treasury instrument directed at the retail sector, the public still does not put a great deal of 
trust in the banks, even with inflation coming down dramatically. Nor, for that matter, do 
banks trust each other. This implies that if the banks want to aggressively expand their deposit 
base to support asset expansion, they would have to pay a significant margin on deposits and 
interbank borrowing.
12  
Finally, NBU supervisory oversight will be tightening. Some excellent, rigorous 
prudential regulations have been and are being developed. With the changes to International 
Accounting Standards (IAS) in 1998, banks will be forced to adopt stronger provisioning for 
impaired loans. All these factors suggest that in the coming months banks' profits could be 
under increasing pressure. 
Some banks will probably try to maintain profits by aggressively expanding balance 
sheets, including business lending. According to newspaper reports, during the first five 
months of 1997, business loans on an annualized basis increased more than 50 per cent
13. The 
danger, of course, is that these loans are not to healthy creditors, particularly when one 
considers the still declining economic growth; the lack of experience bankers have had in 
making loans; and the difficulties in assessing the financial health of a company. Also 
observed since mid-1997 is an increase in bank purchases of corporate securities, a function 
most probably too, of the interest rate decline on government securities. 
All of these factors suggest that the current problems of “adverse selection” (the worst 
borrowers, with nothing to lose, will be the ones willing to pay a high risk premium) could 
become more serious. The conclusion is that in the coming months there could be a decided 
acceleration in the growth of the system's impaired loans — even if government directed 
lending through the banks (and price distortions) were to cease altogether. A final danger is 
                                              
12 In addition, under the “kartoteka” system businesses were only permitted one bank account 
(to make tax collection easier, among other things). The financial impact must have been to add to the 
risk premium since depositors could not hedge their investment by placing deposits in several 
institutions. 
13 “Eastern Economist”, June 3,1997. L. Landy 
CASE Foundation  12
that with profits under pressure, banks may engage still more in riskier off-balance sheet 
activities — guaranties for loans and for joint ventures (particularly construction projects), 
buying deeply discounted suppliers credits, and particularly, for activities connected with 
foreign exchange.  
Although banks have been active participants in the foreign exchange area for some 
time, the difference this year is the presence in the market of substantial foreign portfolio 
inflows. This means that even though the currency is projected to remain relatively stable 
over the medium-term, on a day-to-day basis, with so much offshore money coming into what 
is still a very thin market, volatility could increase. International financial institutions have 
enormous resources. What would be a small marginal loss for an international financial 
institution, making a bad bet on the hryvna, could be a crippling experience for a Ukrainian 
financial entity (many with lax internal controls).
14 
 
3. The Current Approach 
The National Bank of Ukraine, which to date has been the primary government entity 
overseeing the banks, developed a program in the early 1990s concentrating on the financial 
infrastructure and legal underpinnings of the banking system. In collaboration with the 
International Monetary Fund, a matrix of donor assistance was put in place early on to 
develop basic central bank functions — different aspects of bank supervision, development of 
the electronic funds payment system, development of an IAS-based chart of accounts, 
development of a primary market in government securities. Additionally, the NBU took the 
initiative in developing the new NBU Law and the Law on Banks and Banking.  
The World Bank's Financial Sector Structural Adjustment Loan (FSAL) program, was 
begun roughly three years ago. The FSAL added elements to work on the former state banks 
and the savings bank. Finally, the EBRD took responsibility for developing an upgrading 
program for the private banks in the form of a bank credit facility for small and medium size 
enterprises. 
3.1. National Bank of Ukraine: Financial Infrastructure 
3.1.1. Bank Supervision 
The NBU has collaborated with US AID for two years in a technical assistance program 
to develop bank supervision. Professional bank supervisors from the US regulatory agencies, 
the US Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve System, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Office of Thrift Supervision have both lived in 
                                              
14 Moreover, for many international players, Ukraine will be a by-play from the much larger 
Russian market, adding yet another element of unpredictability and volatility. Although the Ukrainian 
market will have its own life, fickle investor attitudes towards Russian fixed-income assets are already 
spilling over into Ukraine. For example in mid-1996, during the Russian election campaign, reputedly 
millions of dollars came into Ukrainian government securities for a short period. This is not unusual 
when a smaller country is geographically and culturally close to a larger country. For example, the 
Canadian dollar too was very much impacted by movements in the US dollar, really into the last 
decade. Developing Sound Banks in Transitional Ecoomies... 
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Ukraine for extended periods and made short-term trips to advise on specialized functions 
such as bank licensing. 
Progress to date in developing professional bank supervision capacity has been slow. 
There has been constant rotation of the Deputy Governor in charge of the function, leading to 
intermittent commitment from senior management. Moreover, the NBU Bank Supervision 
still does not have all the tools at its disposal for either analysis or enforcement. The former 
awaits conversion of the banking system to international accounting standards; the latter 
awaits the uncertain passage of the new National Bank Law, and the revised Law on Banks 
and Banking. 
In an attempt to speed the pace of development, the NBU reorganized the supervision 
function in mid-1997. The head of the bank supervision function is now at the Deputy 
Governor level and separate departments were created for the individual functions (such as 
on-site supervision) with new directors. Together with the momentum, which began to build 
late last year, there is reason to think that the pace of development of the NBU bank 
supervision function could speed up considerably. An evaluation awaits, however, the 
forthrightness which with the NBU will be willing to act in an even handed manner to 
implement excellent prudential regulations recently passed. 
In terms of the different aspects of bank supervision which are part of the US AID 
program: 
On-site Supervision: The Bank Supervision Department (BSD) since late 1996 has 
developed a more systematic schedule of inspections. Ukrainian inspectors are working with 
foreign advisors from the US regulatory agencies. They are following a methodology 
borrowed from the US system but significantly altered to reflect Ukrainian circumstances. 
Off-site Supervision: A Uniform Bank Reporting Requirement (UBPR) is being 
developed together with an early warning system. These should be functioning by the end of 
the year and, will serve as input for the work of on-site supervision, feeding into scheduling 
of on-site examinations. This work, however, will only have credibility after the banks 
convert to international accounting standards in 1998. 
Problem Bank Work: The Bank Resolution Unit was first set up as part of the NBU 
Bank Supervision Department in September 1996. Still, in its early stages, the Bank 
Resolution Department is just in the process of delineating its mission. The objective of the 
US technical assistance program is to build an integrated approach. Banks, in which on-site 
inspections indicate serious problems, would be transferred to this unit for further attention. 
There will be a wide range of approaches from rehabilitation to liquidation. Within the Bank 
Resolution Department there will be an organizational separation between rehabilitation and 
liquidation. 
Deposit Insurance: The Strategy Department of the bank supervision function is still 
developing a framework and doing quantitative work on the implications of different 
scenarios. An advisor from the National Bank of Romania, which US AID has brought to 
Ukraine, and a second advisor from the CASE Foundation in Poland are working with NBU 
counterparts to develop a sound law. However, implementation of a credible system of 
deposit insurance can only come after a) international accounting standards are adopted so an 
accurate financial assessment can be made; and b) the amended banking laws are passed by 
the Ukrainian Parliament which will give the NBU authority to handle rehabilitation and/or 
liquidation of insolvent banks and strengthen NBU prudential regulatory powers.  L. Landy 
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3.1.2. Accounting 
It is not possible with Gosplan bank accounting to make an analysis of individual banks 
because of the distortions to the income and balance sheets
15. The major differences between 
the statutory Ukrainian approach and International Accounting Standards (IAS) include: 
–  cash as opposed to accrual basis; 
–  net income is calculated before charges for taxes, loan-loss provisions; 
–  loan loss provisions are understated; 
–  interbranch transactions are not netted out which inflates balance sheet totals; 
–  inflation adjusted financial statements are not presented; 
–  subsidies not consolidated. 
The NBU has finalized a chart of accounts and compatible reporting forms for the 
commercial banks. On January 1, 1998 banks will have to make the changeover to the IAS 
accounting procedures. Starting in July 1997 there is a six-month period in which the NBU 
has selected twelve pilot banks to test the new procedures. The NBU Accounting Department 
will be supported with advisors from US AID and EU Tacis and by representatives of the 
“Big 6" accounting firms based in Kiev.  
The choices for the pilot banks underwent some degree of scrutiny but due diligence 
was very limited because there has not been rigorous, risk-oriented on-site inspections of 
potential candidates. An attempt was made to include a spectrum of banks in the pilot 
program chosen both on size and activity considerations in order to have a representative 
sample. There will be banks from four regions of the country participating. The work to 
develop new reporting forms compatible with the IAS-based chart of accounts is being 
handled primarily by the NBU Bank Supervision. There has been reasonably close 
collaboration between the NBU's Supervision and Accounting functions.  
The National Bank is making steady progress in developing its own chart of accounts, 
based on International Accounting Standards with the help of an IMF advisor. This work too 
should be finished by early 1998. 
3.1.3. Electronics Funds Payments System (E.F.P.S.) 
The National Bank of Ukraine has arguably one of the best electronic funds payment 
systems in the region. The system is composed of an electronic payment system for 
interregional accounts, and for regional clearinghouse accounts. The system was greatly aided 
by a multimillion grant from US AID. Additionally, US advisors from the Federal Reserve 
System worked with the NBU to develop a disaster-recovery plan. The banking sector now 
has the technical capacity to execute payments in a matter of minutes rather than the days, and 
even weeks as was previously the case. The computer system is currently being modified and 
expanded to accommodate a depository for the registration of government securities. There is 
also a plan to use the E.F.P.S. to set up a collateral registry for moveable property. 
                                              
15 This discussion borrows from Kockler, Thomas, Overview of the Russian Banking System, 
Chase Manhattan Bank Emerging Markets Research, May 30, 1997. 
The World Bank gives the following information: 1994 accounts of Bank Ukraina using the 
statutory Ukrainian approach showed taxable profits of almost $400 million. IAS methodology, 
incorporating NBU provisioning for the same year showed profits of only $235 million. Roe, Alan, 
Banking and Finance in Ukraine, An Update of Developments During 1995, The World Bank, mimeo. Developing Sound Banks in Transitional Ecoomies... 
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3.2. Systemic and Sector Restructuring Issues: The World 
Bank FSAL 
The World Bank began to send Missions to Ukraine in 1994 to develop a Financial 
Sector Structural Adjustment Loan (FSAL). For some time the work languished. However, 
since mid-1996 reasonable progress is being made. Solid accomplishments to date include 
strengthening of prudential oversight with new NBU regulations on capital adequacy, loan 
classification and provisioning. Passage of the enterprise profits tax law, with partial tax 
deductibility of bank loan-loss provisioning is also a step forward. Before the end of the year 
there is some chance that all conditionality will be met so that the FSAL loan could be 
presented to the Board of the World Bank. 
There are five parts to the FSAL conditionality: 
–  First (and foremost) is a stable macro environment as evidence by compliance with the 
IMF program. Of particular interest is the maintenance of liberated and positive real 
interest rates. Structural adjustment in the banking system does not exist in a vacuum; 
–  Next is the legal framework for banking activity. The current law covering the central 
bank and the banking system was passed in 1991
16. The National Bank Law must be in 
first reading by the Verkhovna Rada (the Ukrainian Parliament) before the World Bank 
will conduct an FSAL pre-appraisal mission. The Law on Banks and Banking has not 
even been finalized and its passage is probably at least a year away. Among the most 
important features included in these Amendments to the Law on Banks and Banking are 
those empowering the NBU to close a bank and execute its liquidation. These 
stipulations will be critical in moving ahead with the NBU problem bank strategy. First 
reading of this law in the Verkhovna Rada will be an FSAL conditionality for either 
World Bank Board approval of the loan or for second tranche release; 
–  A third set of conditions overlaps with the IMF work and concerns the development of 
the financial infrastructure, and in particular, bank supervision and IAS accounting 
which were discussed at some length earlier; 
–  Another section discusses specific problems of the banking sector: a) Strengthening 
bank licensing procedures; b) A restructuring program for the state-owned savings 
bank. This will be based on an audit which began in summer 1997; c) Strengthening 
NBU enforcement procedures and capacity for dealing with problem banks; d) A 
deposit insurance system, as discussed earlier; 
–  A final part of the World Bank FSAL conditionality has to do with the three, larger, 
former state banks. The World Bank FSAL requires development of a program to limit 
a systemic spillover from liquidity problems of larger banks, and setting up workout 
units in these institutions. It also has statements about possible reassertion of equity 
ownership from the state, as well as putting bank purchases of premises from the 
government on a commercial basis. Finally, as a condition for World Bank Board 
                                              
16 The law not only regulates the NBU, but also contains authority for commercial banks and the 
savings bank. It is woefully inadequate. The powers of the NBU to supervise commercial banks are 
not well delineated. Drafting of separate new laws for the National Bank and the commercial banks 
was initially started almost four years ago; the National Bank Law still awaits first reading by the 
Verkhovna Rada, while the Law on Banks and Banking is still not even in final draft form. One of the 
most important problems with the current legal structure is that it is unclear whether the NBU has the 
authority to intervene in banks. Banks are established under oblast commercial laws and receive 
specific licenses from the NBU to operate in banking activities. Thus, the NBU does not have clear 
authority to seize assets of insolvent banks. This severely hampers the NBU's enforcement powers. L. Landy 
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presentation there is the condition that the government agree to a scheme for relieving 
the three former state banks of non-performing loans made on instruction from the 
government. The amounts involved are estimated at roughly $250 - $450 million. 
Reportedly, the government has provided for at least some portion of this settlement in 
the 1997 budget. The World Bank premise is that even though directed lending from the 
government still continues, albeit at a much slower pace, the size of the impaired loan 
portfolio at the former state banks is currently, relatively small in terms of the impact on 
the real economy. The former state banks, have serious problems but are solvent and 
over time their share of the market will gradually shrink. These banks and their 
problems will essentially wither away. This may prove too optimistic a view.
17 
3.3. Upgrading the Private Banks: The EBRD Small and 
Medium Enterprise (SME) Credit Line 
While developing an effective government regulatory authority and restructuring the 
banking system to strengthen its collective solvency are necessary, these are not sufficient 
conditions for a sound banking system. Banks also need a business culture which places a 
premium on good banking practice and an incentive structure encouraging adoption of 
market-based banking norms. Self-regulation is every bit as important as government 
regulation. To that end, a bank upgrading program of technical assistance was melded into an 
EBRD credit line which started in 1994, and was implemented in 1995.  
The objectives of the SME line of credit were thus, twofold. First, was to catalyze bank 
lending to the most promising SME businesses. Second, was to help upgrade participating 
banks. In this second aspect, the program structured a technical assistance program which 
contained several modules for participating private banks, including credit training, auditing, 
MIS development. The notion was that this cadre of banks could serve as an example to a 
wider range of banks and encourage other banks to upgrade.  
However, in this respect, tying a project to upgrade banks to a small business credit 
facility has not so far worked. As discussed further on, certain features of the Ukrainian 
banking culture are not what are normally considered acceptable norms in market-based 
banking practice. As yet, Ukrainian banks are not taking the initiative to alter practices in 
order to conform more with western, market-based banking.  
Moreover, the design, and the timing of the program arguably, may have even provided 
negative incentives for due diligence in selecting and monitoring banks in the EBRD credit 
line.
18 Of five banks, which originally qualified, the bank which received the entire first 
                                              
17 A guesstimate is that total loans of these three institutions are somewhat under $1 billion. In 
the worst case scenario, even if 100 per cent of the loan portfolio were impaired, this would still only 
amount to roughly about 1 per cent of GDP. Not only is this dwarfed by the problem of government 
wage and payment arrears, but it is much smaller than the output proportions confronted by many 
other transitional economies. Nonetheless, as noted earlier, given the starting point in Ukraine — the 
disarray of government finances, the depressed economy and the lack of confidence in the banking 
system — even a relatively modest loss by these former state banks, in terms of the amounts, could 
have serious, wider reaching implications. 
18 A World Bank research paper discusses the banking crisis in Latvia. It says, “The banking 
crisis in Latvia came to a head, precipitated in part by the insistence of the Bank of Latvia that all 
banks should prepare and present to its Banking Supervision Department financial statements that had 
been audited on the basis of IAS...A factor which may have pushed some banks into ill-advised lending 
was the ease of availability for certain foreign credit lines that were guaranteed by the Government. 
The banks approved for channeling these credit lines often did not have adequate mechanism in place Developing Sound Banks in Transitional Ecoomies... 
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tranche is the now insolvent Grado Bank.
19 There have also been questions raised about the 
financial condition of a second bank in the facility. Some lessons can be gleaned from this 
experience: 
–  It is difficult to combine a program to upgrade the banks with a small business 
lending facility in the early stages of the transition. There can be conflicting 
incentives between the need to make loans to small businesses, and the objective of 
reinforcing the safety and soundness of the banking system.
20 One obvious conflict is 
that unless the small business facility is actually utilized — loans are being made to 
small businesses — in a short period, its originator (EBRD in this case) might consider 
canceling the facility. From the bank's point of view there is pressure to show that loans 
are being made, because cancellation in the eyes of the international financial 
community is probably worse than not having the facility at all.  
–  It is difficult to do proper due diligence of a Ukrainian Bank at the current time, 
partly because the banking system is not on IAS. A condition of eligibility for the 
EBRD line was an international audit by a “Big Six” accounting firm. The report of 
Grado Bank's auditor, is confidential so it is not possible to know what was said and 
how this audit was interpreted by the responsible EBRD officials in London who 
qualified Grado Bank for the credit facility.  
–  A program which is to concern itself with upgrading the safety and soundness of 
the banking system must have effective monitoring of bank solvency. Donors, such 
as EU Tacis, monitor their twining arrangements with the banks in the EBRD program 
which they are responsible for. The EBRD monitoring unit at the NBU concerns itself 
with the logistics of the program and the merits of individual loans. There is also a 
requirement for annual audits by an international accounting firm. What is missing (and 
now appears to be essential for any program to upgrade the banks through a foreign 
credit line) is a group of analysts (preferably bank supervisors) who: a) Are completely 
arms-length from the banks; b) Develop rigorous criteria for bank eligibility in the 
program; c) Review the overall financial condition of the banks participating in the 
facility, on a regular basis. This should be part of the ongoing supervisory process of the 
                                                                                                                                             
for screening borrowers.” (Fleming, Alex et al, The Baltics-Banking Crises Observed, “Policy 
Research Working Paper”, No. 1647, The World Bank, September 1996. 
19 Grado Bank in Ukraine was considered one of the best of the private banks. It was, in fact, the 
first bank which qualified for the EBRD small business lending facility in 1994. In late 1996 what 
became apparent was that a German reparation facility to victims of Nazi war crimes, for which Grado 
Bank acted as Agent, never reached the intended recipients. It is alleged the management of Grado 
diverted the money to other sources. After forceful complaints by the German government, criminal 
charges were filed against senior management. 
20 This holds not only for a small business facility as described above, but, also applies to other 
types of programs. For example, a deposit insurance scheme which carries with it social safety net 
concerns about safeguarding household savings. A structure such as this could dampen the incentive to 
take forceful actions against errant bank members. 
There are alternative ways to structure a foreign credit facility which U.S. AID has tried 
throughout the world with some notable successes. One approach is to stage the program so that a 
lengthy period of technical assistance precedes bank assumption of credit risk. In the first stage the 
program would be a donor funnel. A local bank would earn fee income by suggesting clients for the 
facility. The local bank would assume credit risk, gradually, as it gains experience from day-to-day 
work with foreign bankers. Another approach is through usage of partial guaranties to encourage 
banks to lengthen the term of a loan. A guaranty could be put on the second half of the loan. A 
guaranty need not even be on loans, but could be placed on spikes in funding costs which would be a 
hedge for the bank on term mismatch. L. Landy 
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National Bank, which is extending a loan guaranty; and concretized by setting up a unit 
with specific responsibility for these proliferating foreign credit lines as part of the 
NBU's bank supervision function. 
–  The National Bank of Ukraine has given a sovereign guaranty to the EBRD credit. 
This is usually not a good idea. This raises the question of whether the program was 
premature. A problem with a sovereign guaranty is that it runs the risk of lessening the 
foreign donor's preexamination as well as ongoing monitoring. It is interesting to note 
that the EBRD's Russian small and micro business lending facility does not have a 
sovereign guaranty. 
4. Going Forward 
What does all the above add up to — how much progress has been made to date and 
what still needs to be addressed? 
First, basic financial infrastructure functions housed in the National Bank have come a 
long way in the last few years, starting as they had from literally nothing. Payments today are 
quickly processed by an efficient electronic funds payment system. Both the commercial 
banks and the central bank should be switched to international accounting standards by 1998. 
The Bank Supervision Department at the NBU has been reorganized and upgraded. The 
efficacy of this new structure will be tested in the coming months. At the rank and file level, 
basic skills of bank supervision are being developed. One can see the contours of a 
professional department in the making. Progress on the legal infrastructure is more 
problematic. The Verkhovna Rada has still not passed new banking laws. This implies that 
NBU regulations will have to be used more extensively, based on the enabling legislation in 
the old law. 
On broader questions affecting banking sector structure, however, progress has been 
slow. There is not a coherent strategy for banking sector restructuring. The questions still to 
be elaborated include: 
i) fragmentation: About 90 per cent of the roughly 200 banks account for less than 15 
per cent of the banking sector's total assets; while more than 85 per cent of the assets are 
concentrated in the largest 20 banks. While higher capital requirements, which are being 
introduced gradually this year, will help, it is not altogether clear that this will have enough 
bite to effectively rationalize the system. 
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Table 4 
Distribution of Banks by Total Assets*, March 1997 
Range ($ million)  Number of Banks  Total ($ billion) Percentage 
Total  191  7.30  100
550 - 815  Top 5  3.82 52
150 - 550  Next 5  1.37 19
40 - 150  11 - 20  0.85 16
30 - 40  21 - 30  0.32 4
.06 - 30  31 - 191  0.94 9
Source: National Bank of Ukraine. 
* Statitics are adjusted to exclude doublecounting because branch report is not consolidated. 
This adjustement represent rougly a 30 per cent downward adjustement in total assets. 
 
ii) fragility: Without full-scale supervisory inspections and international accounting 
standards in place, only guesstimates can be made about the condition of individual banks. 
The consensus, however, among knowledgeable observers is that many banks are on the path 
to insolvency (and indeed some have already arrived). This could accelerate as balance sheets 
quickly expand. The World Bank's FSAL begins to think about this problem but 
understandably, in its early stage, is most concerned with the fundamentals of the financial 
infrastructure. 
iii) Upgrading: There is still no pervasive culture within the banking sector which 
impels these banks to develop their practice in a manner consistent with market-based 
principles. 
Each of these three factors will be considered in turn. 
4.1. Fragmentation — Rationalization of the Fragmented 
Banking Structure  
At the end of 1996 there were approximately 230 entities with banking licenses, of 
which roughly 50 were awaiting either liquidation, rehabilitation, or reorganization. It is 
difficult to make a determination of the optimal number of banks because this judgment 
basically flows from the scope of financial services envisioned for the Ukrainian banking 
sector. Fundamental research on how other transitional economies have approached this 
question would be welcome. There probably is no “right answer,” however. In the industrial 
countries, for example, there is a wide range of solutions. 
In the United States, there are thousands of commercial banks, not to mention savings 
banks, cooperative banks and investment banks. For most of this century U. S. banks were not 
allowed to expand beyond state lines nor to engage in investment banking. Only in the last 
decade has this changed. The 1980s was a difficult period for the US commercial banking 
system. Many of the nation's largest banks were in great difficulty as a result of lending to 
developing countries (the LDC debt crisis). Arguably, aggressive, orchestrated action by the 
Federal Reserve helped ensure an orderly market restructuring of the banking system and 
resulted in a more concentrated banking system structure.
21  
                                              
21 In the early 1980s the Federal Reserve articulated a “too big to fail” policy. The Federal 
Reserve named the banks which would not be allowed to fail because of their prominent role in the 
financial system and the systemic problems which could ensue. The Federal Reserve also allowed L. Landy 
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Just north, in Canada, a completely different banking structure evolved. Like the British 
system, there are a small number of banks with coast-to-coast branching networks. In this 
system too, there had been traditionally a China Wall built between commercial banking and 
investment banking activities, in contrast to many European countries. 
Although there is no “correct” answer, there are several considerations which suggest 
the banking system in Ukraine is operating at less than optimal efficiency because of 
fragmentation and the current small scale of even the larger banks. To begin with, in a big 
country, like Ukraine, one factor to consider is that opting for a model with many small banks 
could be very difficult to supervise — it is costly and inefficient. Even if the small size of 
most of these banks does not warrant an on-site bank inspection, and their simultaneous 
demise would cause the banking system no more than a ripple, they would still require 
substantial supervisory facilities and time in terms of basic off-site monitoring and eventual 
liquidation. This is one factor to consider in view of the current (and for the foreseeable 
future) limited capacity of NBU's Bank Supervision. 
The second point is that the banking system contains an inordinate number of entities 
which are not true financial intermediaries but more properly seen as extensions of enterprise 
treasuries — their primary function is to channel funding to their corporate owners. While 
many may appear to be well-capitalized for the moment, and thus, not a systemic threat, this 
situation could change quickly. These so-called “pocket banks,” with concentrated portfolios 
and large participation in the interbank market, (as well as in some cases soliciting deposits 
from the public) require constant supervisory oversight.  
There is, however, a second problem with these “pocket banks.” Such entities, if 
allowed to operate on the same basis as other commercial banks, perpetuate a banking culture 
of directed lending (in this case to owners rather than to favored government industries). This 
is the antithesis of a market based banking sector, in which lending is to the most efficient 
borrowers on the basis of price competition. (The price too reflects the bank's assessment of 
risk).  
Finally, as noted earlier, banking is one industry where scale is important because of the 
need to diversify risk. Judging from the experience of the more advanced Eastern European 
countries, western banking practice, with its myriad of instruments, can come very quickly 
once banking system development accelerates. Part of this development will be brought by 
western financial institutions, and then emulated by Ukrainian entities. As Ukrainians gain 
experience in western financial institutions too (which is beginning to happen), they will 
bring back to the Ukrainian banking system sophisticated methodology (for example in risk 
management). However, these more advanced methods often mean high fixed costs in the 
form of sophisticated, high powered computer systems which are only financially viable with 
a large enough scale of operations. 
Thus, in summary, there are good reasons to think that the current banking system in 
Ukraine should be rationalized and the number of banks reduced: 
–  Supervisory oversight is currently difficult with so many small entities; 
–  More sophisticated banking implies a certain scale to be efficient because of higher 
fixed costs; 
–  Scale is also important to hedge risk by portfolio diversification; 
                                                                                                                                             
banks to deal with impaired lending portfolios to developing countries in a “liberal” manner, having to 
do with rescheduling agreements and provisioning. This respite defused a highly explosive situation. It 
gave these banks, and others, time to increase capital, and to adequately provision and otherwise deal 
with impaired loan portfolios. Ultimately some of these banks merged and downsized. What emerged 
was a more concentrated, but arguably sounder banking system. Developing Sound Banks in Transitional Ecoomies... 
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–  The banking system cannot be said to be truly market-based until lending to owners 
becomes less pervasive. 
As noted earlier, the inclination is to keep government intervention at a minimum. Thus, 
certainly, when speaking of rationalization, this is not meant to imply that the government 
should develop a bank specific policy. Rather, the role of the government is to establish the 
infrastructure which specifies the regulatory framework. Ideally, once this infrastructure is 
established, it should be applied in an evenhanded way, so that all banks which meet the set 
conditions (such as those currently being developed as part of the World Bank FSAL) will 
have the right to perform banking services. At the same time, the government has to ensure 
that its regulations are stringent enough to carry out its fiduciary role to ensure a safe and 
sound banking system. This is not so straightforward an exercise, however, and will need 
careful thought. There will be countervailing pressures, such as, for example, situations in 
small towns, in which a tiny bank may be the only financial intermediary.  
On January 1, 1998 the minimal statutory capital requirement for a bank to operate will 
be raised to ECU 1 million. As a result, a certain number of banks, which are doing poorly, 
may simply decide to close up shop. The system will rationalize through attrition or merger. 
As noted, a certain number of banks are in the NBU Bank Resolution Department waiting for 
the necessary paperwork to close operations. Certainly, more research would be welcome, 
outlining for the government how effective the current minimal capital requirements will be 
in helping to prune the system of inefficient entities. As can be seen, however, in the 
accompanying table, during the last few years there has been a decided redistribution in 
banking size. Just two years ago, 96 per cent of the banks had less than $1 million in statutory 
capital. By early 1997 that number was only 29 per cent. 
 
Table 5 
Distribution of Banks by Statutory Capital 
    1994  %  1995  %  1996  %  April 1997  % 
Number of Reporting Banks  220 100 210 100 188 100  188  100
US$ Million       
Under 1    210 96 156 74 71 38   54  29 
1.0 - 1.5    3 1 27 13 49 26   48  26 
1.5 - 5.0    5 2 19 9 52 28   62  33 
5.0 - 20.0    2 1 4 2 11 6   19  10 
20.0 - 40.0    0 0 3 1 2 1   2  1 
Above 40.0    0 0 1 1 3 2   3  2 
Total Statutory Capital  $84 mln  $ 300 mln  $ 560 mln    $ 650 mln 
Source: “Monthly Bulletin”, National Bank of Ukraine. 
 
The NBU has a very important tool in its licensing power. There are 32 different 
functions which banks receive permission to engage in, such as specific approval to handle 
foreign exchange transactions. Thus, the banking system has many tiers. In the absence of 
supportive legislation, this licensing tool gives the NBU an effective way to make the banking 
system safer during the early stages of the transition. At the current time the spread of banks 
access to the different functions is as follows; 
 L. Landy 
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32  operations    8  banks 
28-31 operations    57 banks 
8-27  operations    71  banks 
5-12 operations     42 banks  
 
In 1996 the NBU used its licensing authority to enforce the requirement of its 
regulations that only banks with an authorized capital fund of ECU 500,000 would be eligible 
for full foreign exchange licenses (the ability to receive deposits and grant credits in foreign 
currencies and enter into direct correspondent relationships). This action resulted in the 
removal of foreign exchange licenses from 26 banks. A logical follow-on action now would 
be to use the minimal capital requirement to restrict domestic currency operations (e.g., 
deposit taking) of technically insolvent banks. These banks should not be able to accept 
deposits from the public nor participate in the interbank market. 
Another potentially powerful tool for dealing with the “pocket banks” described earlier 
is the tightening and aggressive implementation of NBU regulations on concentrations of 
loans to one borrower and on loans to insiders. Banks, which basically service owners, under 
a strict “lending to one borrower” NBU regulation, would no longer be able to fulfill their 
original function. They would either cease functioning or develop into genuine financial 
intermediaries. The problem with the law, however, is that in its current form it can be easily 
circumvented because the lending to one borrower is not on a consolidated basis. This should 
be a priority for change. 
4.2. Dealing Systematically with Problem Banks 
Impaired loan portfolios have been the Achilles heel of virtually every banking system 
in the new, transitional economies. For the state banks, and former state banks, the reason, 
more often than not, is continuation of directed lending to favored sectors. And for the private 
banks, although there is some jawboning from the state, the problem stems more from lax 
licensing in the early days which spawned poorly capitalized banks with no experience in 
lending, a fascination with sophisticated western financial instruments, and a proclivity to 
lend to owners and associates. 
There have been banking crises in many countries, be they traumatic as in Bulgaria, or 
merely scares, as in Russia and Ukraine (in August 1995 and March/April 1995, respectively, 
when the interbank market seized up and the central banks quickly pumped in liquidity to 
defuse the situation). Too often, strategy comes after the crisis and is costly to an ill-prepared 
government.  
There is good reason why the question of impaired loan portfolios of the state and 
former state banks is of some concern to the government. To begin with, these entities 
account for the overwhelming share of banking sector assets. Thus, liquidity problems of 
these largest Ukrainian entities pose could spillover into problems for the entire banking 
system, and the economy.  
A need too, for an increase in capitalization of these entities, or other public support, 
could result in a call on the budget. The fiscal effects, and in turn the impact on macro 
stabilization policies and the real economy would not be limited, however, to the direct 
impact on the budget (through recapitalization of the banks). The reduction of liquidity to 
enterprises could hamper their ability to pay taxes, while the reduction of the deposit base 
could reduce demand for treasury securities, and thus raise government funding costs. Finally, 
because a significant share of the problem loan portfolio results from directed credit at the Developing Sound Banks in Transitional Ecoomies... 
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behest of the government, these loans are basically the government's responsibility even if not 
covered by official guaranties. 
To reiterate, however, a point made earlier, this is not exactly the same problem that, for 
example, faced several of the Central European countries. For these countries, the size of the 
impaired loan portfolios, relative to GDP was a burden, among other things, for its sheer 
magnitude. For Ukraine, the problem is more subtle and understood best as a function of a 
relatively much less propitious starting point — the current troubled state of government 
finances, the economic decline still taking place in at least the official sector, and the 
substantial public mistrust of the banking sector. 
In the transitional economies there has been a wide range of programs for dealing with 
impaired loan portfolios of the state banks. One could think of a spectrum of centralized to 
decentralized approaches. Slovenia and Macedonia could be considered examples of the 
former, in which a separate bank rehabilitation agency was established and impaired loans of 
the banks were transferred to this new government agency. However, in both countries there 
were serious problems with this approach. First, it was difficult to find good professional 
staffing. Second, the National Bank felt its prerogatives impinged upon and was not fully 
collaborative. Third, the banks themselves were not willing to hand over credit portfolios and 
otherwise cooperate.  
Poland is an example of a decentralized approach. In exchange for recapitalization, 
Polish State Banks had to aggressively work out their portfolios. By a specified deadline, 
banks were required to sign reconciliation agreements with enterprises holding overdue loans. 
This program is considered a qualified success because it catalyzed a change in the banks 
from passive to active creditors; trained staff in workout and related credit procedures; and 
performed a triage on the impaired loan portfolio — separating out potential future clients 
who needed temporary liquidity from the unviable entities which were forced into liquidation. 
However, bank-led restructuring seemingly did not, by and large, greatly improve corporate 
governance and restructuring of client enterprises. Nor, was there always even handed 
treatment for holders of suppliers' credits
22.  
Moreover, the Polish experience had unique characteristics which would probably make 
it of limited applicability to Ukraine. These factors include; clear government ownership of 
state banks; a talented and activist nucleus at the Ministry of Finance; a large government 
recapitalization fund which had been initially given by Western governments for exchange 
rate stabilization; and an already skilled group of bankers with substantial experience with 
western financial markets.  
Nonetheless, there is much to be said for a decentralized approach — for not setting up 
a separate government entity to deal with problem loans separate from the banks. Particularly, 
in Ukraine, with already badly fragmented government authority, it probably is wiser not to 
proliferate more government institutions, particularly given the scarcity of skilled 
professionals 
As noted earlier, the question of the three former state banks is being addressed in the 
World Bank FSAL. However, the basic thesis of the World Bank is that the problem is not 
large and the former state banks (and their directed lending) will wither away. Based on this 
view, there is not yet an aggressive attempt in the FSAL to develop a comprehensive 
restructuring program for these entities. Once the NBU bank supervision has completed full-
scale on-site examinations, there will be a more informed view of the weaknesses of these 
banks; and a better handle on both the stock and the flow of the impaired loan portfolio. 
                                              
22 Grey, Cheryl and Arnold Holle, Bank-Led Restructuring in Poland, “Policy Research 
Working Paper”, No. 1650, September 1996.  L. Landy 
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In the case of the private banks the problem is somewhat different as no argument can 
be made for government financial underwriting of any troubled private, profit making entities 
whose problems basically reflect poor management and inexperience. (There are some 
instances where private banks have underwritten projects at the government's urging and 
guaranty, but these are the exceptions.) For private banks, the question is how to strengthen 
the NBU Bank Supervision's bank resolution work which has picked up some momentum 
lately, but is still inadequate. The other part of the equation is the absence of legislation 
giving the NBU clear enforcement authority, as noted before. 
4.3. Bank Upgrading — Developing a Core of International 
Standards Banks 
Another absolutely critical element is development of a program which encourages the 
improvement of corporate governance in the new private banks. While not reaching the 
proportions of similar Russian entities (where several have now grown larger than the former 
state banks), the private banks in Ukraine are increasing market share. As noted earlier, 
however, currently, there is no strong incentive for these entities to develop their banking 
practice in accord with generally accepted market-based banking principles.  
For example, one commonly accepted practice in western banking is to ensure 
objectivity in a loan workout, there is a China Wall between individuals who originally made 
the loan and/or have a relationship with the borrower. This is not always the practice of 
Ukrainian banks. Even larger banks, do not always have well-established procedures for 
separating these functions through workout departments. In fact, the banking culture 
emphasizes more that the person(s) who made the loan has the responsibility to collect it. 
There is also in western banking strict regulation of the concentration of loans to one 
borrower and particularly to insiders (owners and management). Moreover, these loans must 
be made on the same, unsubsidized basis as other assets. These norms are still not at all part 
and parcel of accepted banking practice in Ukraine. 
How then indeed, can the banking culture and practice in Ukraine change? Basically, it 
is an organic process which comes from the banks themselves and is just beginning. There are 
two components: First, foreign banks come to Ukraine; and second, domestic banks develop 
an outward orientation and try to increase their ties to international financial markets. Each of 
these factors will be discussed below. 
4.3.1. Foreign Banks Entry 
The Ukrainian banking system, is characterized not only by fragmentation with many 
small entities (as discussed earlier), but also concentration with a group of 10 banks 
accounting for roughly 70 per cent of total assets. An infusion of competition by world 
standard foreign banks will be a healthy development. What has occurred in other transitional 
economies is that entry of foreign banks entry has increased competition, and introduced new 
products and services. Foreign banks also provide a training ground for banking 
professionals. These individuals will, in turn, spread out to indigenous Ukrainian banks, 
bringing new ways of doing business, and equally important, a market-oriented banking 
culture. But, this, osmosis takes time.  
Ukraine, however, is a large, potentially rich country, with clever, skilled people. If the 
environment is hospitable for the international banks, and their corporate clients, and it makes 
business sense, these entities will come. The broad range of technical assistance foreign 
donors are currently supporting, from tax reform to support for the adoption of international Developing Sound Banks in Transitional Ecoomies... 
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accounting standards, will provide an infrastructure over time as sound stabilization policies 
gain credence and growth resumes. However, a supportive infrastructure is a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition. 
Although policy is relatively liberal, foreign banks still do not always receive clear 
signals from the government on how favorably a license application will be received and what 
activities they will be allowed to engage in. The Ukrainian government has still not worked 
out a fully delineated policy. For example, there is some discussion at official levels of an 
entry tax in the form of a purchase of an insolvent Ukrainian bank (as was defacto required in 
Poland, for a certain period). In the current, less propitious Ukrainian environment, this could 
be a significant deterrent. Moreover, the logistics necessary before a license is granted can be 
difficult and protracted, in Societe Generale's case about nine months. Responsibility at the 
NBU is divided. Foreign bankers can spend an inordinate amount of time, ascertaining who 
has the authority to answer different questions.  
  The government should more clearly articulate how welcoming it wishes to be of 
foreign banks and which banking activities they will have access to; and issue a clear policy 
on its decisions; as well as developing well-delineated procedures; and ensuring a level 
playing field for all potential investors. The best policy would be for the government to have 
an open door for any reputable bank which can meet NBU prudential requirements. This 
specifically means eliminating the current regulation in the law which puts a 15 per cent limit 
on foreign holdings of the system's statutory capital.
23  
4.3.2. Orienting Toward Western Financial Markets 
While the differences between Ukraine and Russian financial markets are enormous, in 
this area the experience of Russia is useful. What is seemingly developing in Russia is a very 
effective mechanism for inducing banks, on a voluntary basis, to undertake a program of 
upgrading. The program is called the Financial Institutions Development Program (FIDP). 
The FIDP is a joint effort of the EBRD and the World Bank, under control of an Inter-
ministerial Committee, but with significant participation by the Central Bank of Russia. 
The most important point about the FIDP is that from September 1996 there was a 
separate unit established, monitoring solvency and condition of the participating banks (as 
well as developing tough criteria for entry). The unit is staffed both by Russians with 
regulatory experience, and by foreign bank supervisors (two of whom previously participated 
in US AID bank supervision projects in Russia and Macedonia). The unit reports to the Inter-
ministerial Committee.  
There are currently 32 banks, which have qualified for the FIDP program, selected from 
about 80 applicants. Over the last year, the program has changed considerably, learning from 
early design mistakes. As initially designed, the incentives were a) twinning with a foreign 
bank; b) computer equipment for information technology development. What has turned out 
to be the real basis for the program's popularity, however, is that it is now seen as important 
for a Russian Bank which wants to have an international presence.  
By and large, foreign investors and foreign financial institutions will look at the banks 
which have qualified for the FIDP. The foreign investors are using membership in the FIDP 
as a culling mechanism. The top Russian banks have become active borrowers in the 
Eurodollar market. They also actively engage in correspondent relations, foreign exchange 
                                              
23 According to NBU statistics, in April 1997 the statutory capital of the banking system was 
$650 million. This means that foreign bank investment could only amount to about $100 million.  L. Landy 
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dealings and custodian arrangements for foreign entities in the Russian government paper 
market
24. Thus, membership in the FIDP is highly desirable for them. 
Would this same incentive apply to Ukraine? Undoubtedly, although the timing is 
uncertain. What we have seen in recent months is that once a country is discovered, there is 
considerable portfolio investment which will come in very fast. For example, in the first two 
months of 1997, offshore investors purchased almost 50 per cent of Ukraine's primary market 
government securities. (As a consequence the hryvna strengthened, and reportedly, NBU 
intervention was even needed at points to stem the currency's appreciation.)  
Investment in the Ukrainian government securities market usually requires a custody 
agreement with a Ukrainian Bank. First Ukrainian International Bank (which is partially 
owned by foreign investors) has been the bank of choice to date. Going forward, however, 
one entity will not be able to handle, by itself, a greatly increased volume of foreign portfolio 
investment which will most assuredly come into the market if macroeconomic stability 
continues. Several large mutual funds, such as Regent and Caspian have formed multimillion 
dollar Ukrainian funds and will be looking for the services of Ukrainian banks.  
There is also interest by several of the larger Ukrainian private banks in finding foreign 
strategic investors, not to mention the more pedestrian business in terms of correspondent 
relationships and letter of credit guarantees. Then too, when Ukraine finally does access 
international euromarkets, domestic banks will be interested in establishing business ties with 
foreign investment banks which hold mandates from the Ukrainian government for the issues.  
What this implies is that, as in Russia, an institutional mechanism will be needed to 
determine “international standard banks” which meet certain stringent criteria. This could 
develop in several ways, including a private bank rating agency which advises banks about 
potential lending in the interbank market. As the NBU Bank Supervision gains professional 
expertise (and increases staffing), it too can play a pivotal signaling role through such things 
as more aggressively using its licensing authority to tier banks, as well as formally approving 
bank participation in foreign credit lines for which the NBU is extending guaranties. The 
objective is that a cadre of banks emerges which is interested in integrating into the 
international financial community and emulating acceptable international practice.  
5. Summary 
To summarize, going forward the difficulties for Ukrainian banks could increase, as 
relatively low-risk (high-return) income sources for banks diminish. Moreover, although the 
banking system is currently relatively small, and the impact on government finances from 
even a large banking sector problem would be relatively contained, the instability of the 
banking sector is still a situation which should elicit concern. This flows from the current 
problematic government fiscal situation, still falling growth in at least the official economy, 
and the public skepticism about the usage of the banks as a safe storehouse for savings — 
even though inflation is at respectable levels. 
There are three elements which should be the foundation of a strategy to develop a safe 
and sound banking system in Ukraine: 
                                              
24 Most recently, Alliance, a leading U.S. money manager, formed a joint-venture with one of 
Russia's largest private banks, SBS-Agro Bank to manage ruble-denominated mutual funds for 
Russians. “Wall Street Journal”, July 3, 1997. Developing Sound Banks in Transitional Ecoomies... 
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–  The banking system is fragmented. There needs to be rationalization so that 
remaining entities which have deposit-taking authority; first, compose a system which is 
not unwieldy for the NBU to supervise; second are true financial intermediaries, rather 
than arms of corporate treasuries; and third, have a large enough scale to allow portfolio 
diversification and to spread startup costs. 
–  The banking system is fragile. There needs to be a culling in which banks not meeting 
NBU capital requirements and insolvent banks are purged from the system. There also 
needs to be a plan developed for former state banks which addresses, among other 
things, corporate governance and lack of transparency in the ownership structure. 
(Depending upon conclusions reached by on-site inspections, conducted by the NBU's 
bank supervision function there may be a need for some form of recapitalization).  
–  The banking system lacks incentives for upgrading. There needs to be a mechanism 
to separate out a core group of international standard banks. These banks will set the 
pace for the rest of the banking system to develop banking practice in a manner 
consistent with market-based norms — to put in place, more rigorous internal controls, 
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Appendix: Separating the Wheat from the Chaff: Developing 
a Sound Banking System in Ukraine 
The development of a financial sector strategy for Ukraine, happily, is not virgin 
territory. By now it is a well-traveled path for the transitional economies of this region. 
Eastern Europe has spawned as many models as there are countries. As noted earlier, there are 
a great many similar characteristics between the banking systems of these former centrally-
planned economies. What is unique for each of these countries, is the way these 
characteristics are combined.  
General factors to consider include: 
–  Macroeconomic dislocation: There has been severe macroeconomic adjustment. This 
reflects the fundamental need to move to market based pricing, to cut subsidies, to 
relocate production factors in viable industries and to end the “soft budget constraint”. 
In the wake of these large gyrations, many countries went through a period of 
accelerating inflation (and even hyperinflation for some), which, in turn, resulted in 
substantial financial disintermediation. Moreover, the disintegration of the Soviet bloc 
resulted in serious problems for trade. For some countries this meant that critical 
commodities, such as energy products, were no longer available at subsidized prices. 
For others it meant that substandard exports to, essentially, a captive market, now had to 
compete in international markets.  
–  Structural reform: In the centrally-planned system, banks passively accommodated 
the central production plan and had no independent role in credit allocation. (While 
declining, governments still use the banks for directed lending, as they did during the 
communist regimes.) For these banking systems, there was no need for risk-based 
government bank supervision, nor for legislation delineating property rules and 
collateral standards, nor for bankruptcy procedures. Thus, developing a market 
economy entails not only dismantling old institutions but, in some instances, the 
development of institutions and practices unknown in the former communist system — 
such as risk-based bank supervision. Moreover a new legal infrastructure has to be 
developed which reflects the emerging economic relations, and in particular the respect 
for contracts. 
–  Financial Intermediation: The public has little confidence in the banking system as a 
depository for savings, as evidenced by the falling level of financial intermediation 
(M2/GDP). Hyperinflation, confiscation of bank deposits, chain reaction bank failures 
have all played a contributing role to public cynicism toward the banks. 
–  Human Capital Development: This is a priority. The corollary of dismantling old 
institutions and developing new ones is that significant retraining is needed, not only in 
technical skills, hitherto unknown, such as risk analysis and asset-liability management, 
but cultural attitudes as well. An internal culture has to be developed within banks that 
puts a premium on “good banking practice.”  
–  Political Consensus: The termination of authoritarian control and the development of 
effective democratic governance is an evolving process. In some countries political 
power is too fragmented to allow decisive movement forward on reform, while in others 
the political power of those interests, which benefited from the former system, still 
holds sway. In this environment it takes a long time for effective legislation to be 
implemented. In the interim, patching is often needed. This may mean using the central 
bank's regulatory power in a more creative way. Developing Sound Banks in Transitional Ecoomies... 
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–  Definition of the central bank: The central bank has often borne the brunt of the 
struggle in transitional economies to end the “soft budget constraint” — using banks to 
fund state enterprises and favored, if inefficient sectors; and its corollary, to limit 
government budget deficit financing through central bank financing. Thus, in many 
countries, the central bank, never popular, is engaged in a constant struggle with less 
progressive government elements to limit its independence and power. 
–  Bank Licensing: In many transitional economies the early stages, before bank 
supervision was well organized, were characterized by liberal licensing policies. 
Spawned was a fragmented, inefficient, and weak banking industry.  
–  Prudential Regulations: There is a wide spectrum in the commitment of governments 
of this region to rigorously regulate the banks and empower a bank supervision function 
to oversee the safety of the banking system. 
 
Applying these general considerations for transitional economies to Ukraine brings 
some of the elements which must be addressed into sharper focus: 
–  “Rules of the Game” are not well established for the banking industry. The culture 
is still very much a hybrid, partially reflecting the confiscatory, authoritarian modus of 
the Communist system under which banks were little more than financing arms of the 
Ministry of Finance (and although less pervasive, directed lending continues to favored 
industries). It also, increasingly, reflects what could only be termed Dickensonian or 
cowboy capitalism — a capitalism in which anything goes. Thus, for observers reared 
in western business ethics and rules, some aspects of banking practice, such as the 
magnitude of the concentration of bank loans to insiders is quite startling. Codifying 
business ethics and practice for the banking industry is a priority. 
–  Technical capacity at both the NBU and the commercial banks is thin. Unlike many 
other countries in the region, Ukraine (which had not been a sovereign country for 
literally ages), by and large does not currently have a stratum of banking professionals 
who interacted with western bankers during the Communist years (if only through 
London Club debt negotiations as did Romania, Yugoslavia, Russia and Poland) and 
assimilated western banking techniques. While skills are being implanted through such 
programs as the Muskie Fellowship (which gives fellowships for US study, often 
followed by jobs in western commercial and investment banks), it will be some time 
before a critical mass is reached. Training courses through the NBU-National Bankers 
Association sponsored National Center for the Training of Bank Personnel, which bring 
foreign bankers supported by US AID for one-week courses, are useful as an 
introduction for large numbers of junior and mid-level bankers. However, this 
mechanism can only provide the depth needed over an extended period. 
–  Ukraine, as a country, is in a precarious financial position. External current account 
deficit financing and foreign amortization payments are primarily financed by loans and 
grants from international agencies (IMF, World Bank, etc.) and by foreign governments' 
loans and grants. Financing of the government's domestic budget over the last year has 
been paid for, in part, by the accumulation of substantial arrears in wages and payments. 
Thus, there is seemingly, no room in the budget for bank recapitalization. 
–  Financial disintermediation is taking a long time to reverse, even with inflation 
decelerating for over a year and the exchange rate stable. Recent bank failures, like 
Grado Bank, have not helped to calm the nerves of a skeptical and cynical public. There 
is also the point that a substantial share of income is earned in the informal sector. A 
bank account exposes that income to taxes. Finally, rules such as the “kartoteka” (which L. Landy 
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prohibited businesses from having more than one bank account) had limited deposit 
growth. 
–  Licensing was very lax in the early days and the banking sector is highly 
fragmented (as discussed earlier). 
–  Concern with the fragility structure of the banking system currently does not 
extend beyond the National Bank of Ukraine and even there, the pure magnitude of 
day-to-day brush fires precludes work on developing a more strategic approach to 
systemic problems. This is interrupted only in a significant way when the World Bank 
FSAL Mission visits. However, because of both the fiscal implications of a banking 
sector restructuring and the potentially damaging effect on the real economy, the reach 
of involvement should be much broader. All too often the executive and legislative 
branches get involved too late, only after a damaging banking crisis is in progress
25. 
–  Unlike many other transitional countries, it is not the case that reform elements 
unequivocally asserted their ascendancy. The left-dominated Verkhovna Rada wields 
considerable power and actively impedes reform. A large section of the Verkhovna 
Rada still clings to the belief that banks should continue to serve the “public interest” 
which is part and parcel of a more profound opposition in the parliament to all emerging 
capitalist structures. Thus, the NBU and its reform-minded Governor, are constantly 
under attack. There is an ongoing struggle to limit the NBU's authority. The pending 
National Bank Law, for example, provides for a supervisory council over the National 
Bank, although its mandate is not well delineated. 
                                              
25 In the United States the savings and loan crisis was allowed to fester for years. Only after the 
costs to the U.S. taxpayers mounted to billions of dollars did the U.S. Congress and the U.S. Treasury 
(the Ministry of Finance) become involved in setting up a new government agency, the Resolution 
Trust Company, to liquidate and rehabilitate insolvent and troubled savings institutions.  Developing Sound Banks in Transitional Ecoomies... 
 S&A No. 115  31
Table 6 
Principal Central Bank Regulatory Guidelines 
Capital Requirements:  I    Statuatory fund: ECU 1 million by January 1998
  II    Banks with 100 percent foreign ownership: ECU 5.0 million by 
January 1998
Capital Adequacy  I    Capital equal to 8 percent of risk-weighted assets.
Requirements:  II    Not mandatory but part of evaluation: capital equal to 5 per cent 
total liabilities
Classification of Loans and Loan-  Category  Reserve 
Loss Provisioning*  Standard 2 per cent
    Nonstandard 5 per cent
    Substandard 20 per cent
    Doubtful 50 per cent
    Loss 100 per cent
Insider Lending and Limits on Large 
Exposures** 
Loans to insiders not more than 100 per cent of  bank's capital; 
decreasing to 25 per cent by July 1, 1998.
Limits on Equity 
Investment  
I    Total equity investment  not more than 25 percent of total 
capital.
  II  Equity investments will be deducted in estimation of total 
capital.
* Requirements of new Regulation No. 20 will be phased over two years beginning July 1, 
1997. Only “standard” provisioning, which is a general provision (and part of Tier 2 capital) is tax 
deductable. The other categories are not tax deductable. 
** Will not be mandatory until Law on NBU is passed. 